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Abstract  
Using information on mutual fund trades executed from 1998 to 2017 by 31,513 
individual investor clients of a major Portuguese financial institution, we study the 
relationship between the disposition effect, financial literacy and trading experience. We 
find that mutual fund investors exhibit strong disposition effect. The tendency to hold 
losers is partially offset with literacy: not only holding a university degree reduces the 
propensity to hold on to loser funds but also higher financial knowledge and stronger 
math skills reduce the disposition effect. Literacy also plays a role in shaping the way 
experience affects this bias. Evidence of the disposition effect persists after accounting 
for redemption fees, bad emotions, irrational beliefs, market sentiment and the existence 
of someone to blame.  
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1. Introduction 
Do participants1 in mutual funds exhibit disposition effect? Is this behavioral bias 
attenuated by financial literacy or trading experience? Using a novel proprietary database 
from a major Portuguese financial institution containing transaction-level records for a 
twenty-year span, we attempt to answer to these questions.  
In the last decades, behavioral finance has challenged the traditional view that 
financial assets are rationally priced and reflect all available information. Accordingly, 
certain market anomalies could be explained with the presence of individual investors’ 
irrational behavior (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler 1995). Amid the innumerous biases that 
have been underlined by behavioral economists, the disposition effect brought forward 
by Shefrin and Statman (1985) stands out. In short, the disposition effect is characterized 
by a higher propensity of investors to sell assets on which they have experienced gains 
and to hold assets on which they have faced (unrealized) losses. The existence of this 
behavioral bias may have relevant welfare implications because it imposes substantial 
costs on investors. As highlighted by Kaustia (2010), the disposition effect imposes a 
higher tax-burden than necessary for individual investors. Moreover, it may interfere with 
forward-looking decision making, thereby inducing inferior performance (Goetzmann 
and Massa 2008). 
There is already a bulk of empirical evidence pointing towards the existence of 
disposition effect in the stock trading patterns of individual investors. Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001) document disposition effect in a sample of investors from Finland. 
Odean (1998) finds that US investors tend to sell stocks whose prices increased and to 
hold losers. Feng and Seasholes (2005) and Chen et al. (2004) find disposition effect 
among Chinese investors. Barber and Odean (2007) find disposition effect for individual 
and institutional investors in Taiwan, with individuals displaying the strongest disposition 
effect. Brown et al. (2006) uncover weaker disposition effect for traders making large 
trades in Australia. While conducting an experiment, Weber and Camerer (1998) also 
show that individuals are more likely to sell winners than losers. Frazzini (2006) reports 
that mutual funds sell equities held for a gain at a higher rate than those held for a loss, 
being this tendency stronger following years of poor fund performance.  
In contrast with the stock market, little attention has been paid to the disposition 
effect among mutual fund participants. Nevertheless, understanding the role of this 
                                                          
1 We use the terms “mutual fund participants” and “mutual fund investors” interchangeably in this study.  
2 
 
behavioral bias in the context of mutual fund participants is relevant for several reasons. 
In fact, regardless of the financial instrument, the existence of the disposition effect 
imposes costs on investors. Individual investors have been shifting their investment 
strategies from a direct exposure to the stock market through individual stocks to an 
indirect exposure via mutual funds (Boehmer and Kelley 2009). Thus, if this behavioral 
bias is weaker (stronger) in mutual fund trading activity then individual investors have 
lower (higher) costs when they invest relatively more in mutual funds than in stocks.  
Second, the existence of disposition effect leads to less efficient markets and the eventual 
inexistence of this bias in mutual fund investments may contribute to more efficient 
financial markets given the higher relevance of the assets under management of mutual 
funds.  
Finally, there are important consequences for the mutual funds industry if 
investors exhibit disposition effect. On the downside, the disposition effect may have 
implications in terms of the relationship between participants (the principal) and fund 
managers (the agent). The existence of disposition effect in this market diminishes 
individual investors’ reaction to poor performance and thus distorts market discipline 
mechanisms. In essence, managers will face lower pressure if investors do not respond to 
poor performance and remain attached to losing funds. Hence, managers will have fewer 
incentives in pursuing the interests of their clients. Measuring the disposition effect and 
its impact is thus useful in understanding market dynamics.  
On the upside, the presence of disposition effect among mutual fund participants 
may have important implications in terms of the liquidity risk of the fund. If the 
performance of the fund plunges, it is unlikely that investors displaying disposition effect 
will exert abnormal outflow pressure. This diminishes the liquidity needs of the mutual 
fund and attenuates the need to carry out fire sales. 
The conclusions of existing studies for mutual funds conflict with those obtained 
for the stock market, particularly in the US. Ivković and Weisbenner (2009) obtain results 
that conform to the idea that the disposition effect does not affect mutual fund participants 
in the US. These results are, in general, consistent with those of Bailey, Kumar, and Ng 
(2011), who show that US mutual fund investors are, on the aggregate, more sophisticated 
than those that trade only stocks. Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009a) do not find 
evidence of disposition effect among Swedish mutual fund participants. Related research 
on the flow-performance relationship (Ferreira et al. 2012) reveals substantial differences 
across countries, and also that mutual fund investors tend to sell losers more and to buy 
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winners less in more developed countries, meaning that US findings do not map directly 
onto other countries. For Portugal, Alves and Mendes (2011) find an absence of reaction 
to past performance and persistence of fund flows, which contrasts with the US 
experience. 
Chang, Solomon, and Westerfield (2016) find evidence consistent with the notion 
that investors avoid realizing losses because they dislike admitting that past purchases 
were mistakes, but delegation reverses this effect by allowing the investor to blame the 
manager instead. Accordingly, the propensity to realize past gains more than past losses 
applies only to nondelegated assets like individual stocks; delegated assets, like mutual 
funds, exhibit a robust reverse-disposition effect. However, an alternative explanation is 
that behavioral biases may manifest differently across different asset classes or even amid 
different securities. In effect, this reasoning is aligned with the findings of Kumar (2009) 
that the disposition effect is more pronounced amid stocks that are more complex to value.  
This study investigates the disposition effect among mutual fund investors using 
a sample of 31,513 investors of a major Portuguese financial institution in the period 
comprised between 1998 and February 2017. Our methodology lies on the Cox 
proportional hazard model and our findings hint at a strong disposition effect among 
mutual fund investors: the probability of a redemption ramps up more than 70 percentage 
points when the mutual fund is not trading at a loss.  
In our second research question, we inquire whether financial literacy and trading 
experience weaken the disposition effect exhibited by mutual fund investors. Prior 
research indicates that investors’ heterogeneity affects behavioral biases. For instance, 
experience and sophistication have been pointed out as moderators of the disposition 
effect (Feng and Seasholes 2005). Chen et al. (2004) and Choe and Eom (2009) also 
establish a negative link between trading experience and the disposition effect in a sample 
of Chinese and Korean investors, respectively. Shapira and Venezia (2001) find stronger 
disposition effect for independent stock market investors than for those advised by 
brokers in Israel. Dhar and Zhu (2006) find that around 20% of investors exhibit reverse 
disposition effect, active traders being more willing to accept losses.    
We evaluate the role of literacy as a potential moderator of the disposition effect. 
We anticipate that individuals with higher levels of literacy will plausibly behave more 
rationally. General literacy, measured by the level of education, is “fundamental for 
obtaining a correct perception of financial information and available opportunities, as 
well as being crucial in the decision-making process” (Abreu and Mendes 2010, p.517). 
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We estimate our baseline model for two subsamples, one including investors holding a 
university degree and the other with the remaining individuals, and conclude that general 
literacy is a pervasive determinant of the disposition effect among mutual fund 
participants: the hazard ratio goes down by 44 percentage points when we move from the 
second to the first group.  
There is another dimension of financial literacy which is not captured by the 
general level of education: the individual knowledge about financial markets and products 
(Abreu and Mendes 2010). Financially informed investors are aware of the existing 
financial options, choices and consequences, and thus are better positioned to increase 
their well-being. Considering that an individual who has a qualified occupation in the 
financial sector (banks, insurance, and brokerage firms), is a business consultant, auditor 
or economist is more knowledgeable about financial markets and products, our results fit 
well with the notion that higher financial literacy (or stronger math skills) also reduce the 
reluctance to sell losers or the propensity to sell winners. 
We also assess the importance of trading experience as a moderator of the 
disposition effect. Our findings suggest that stock and bond trading initiation hardly affect 
the disposition effect, but derivative trading lessens the reluctance to redeem funds that 
are valued below purchase price. As to trading foreign financial instruments, it does not 
change the disposition effect exhibited by mutual fund participants. These results tell us 
that not all experience types help mitigate behavioral biases. In specific, experience in 
trading sophisticated financial instruments such as derivatives appears to produce greater 
effects in moderating the disposition effect than trading traditional securities such as 
stocks or bonds. 
Next, we take the investigation a step forward and examine two distinct features 
of the trading background of mutual fund investors: trading intensity and diversity. Our 
results reveal that the number of buy trades and the turnover value of buy trades attenuate 
the disposition effect displayed by mutual fund investors, but the number of day trades 
performed by the participant does not appear to impact the size of the disposition effect. 
The number of different securities traded, and the number of different funds traded by the 
investor are used to measure diversity, and both measures lessen the disposition effect. 
When we consider the number of fund (buy) transactions, we find that, on average, mutual 
fund participants with more past fund transactions exhibit lower disposition effect. 
We add piecewise linear components of the number of buy trades and 
corresponding turnover value to the baseline specification. Strikingly, we find that the 
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disposition effect displayed by mutual fund participants with more than 20 buy trades is 
residual. If one considers instead adding piecewise linear components of the number of 
different securities traded, holding more than six different securities would also eliminate 
almost entirely the disposition effect. Most prominently, individuals with more than 30 
(buy) transactions of mutual funds present a reverse disposition effect. 
Finally, we appraise whether literacy boosts or attenuates the effect of experience 
on the disposition effect, and we find that the number of different funds, the number of 
different securities, the number of trades conducted in stock exchanges, and the turnover 
value generated by those trades attenuates the disposition effect of individuals with and 
without a university degree. Intriguingly, our findings suggest that day trading produces 
opposite effects on the disposition effect of individuals with and without financial 
literacy. In effect, while day trading reduces the disposition effect for those without 
financial literacy, those with financial literacy present a positive association between day 
trading and the disposition effect.  
In supplementary tests, we consider alternative explanations for our findings, and 
our conclusions are preserved even after accounting for these alternative explanations. 
For instance, we examine whether irrational beliefs of investors on mean reversion 
patterns of fund returns could explain our findings. We find evidence consistent with 
irrational beliefs, but the disposition effect survives even after accounting for the 
existence of this bias. We also evaluate the effect of market sentiment on the results (we 
split the sample into bull and bear periods). While the disposition effect is statistically 
and economically significant during both periods, it is more sizable during bull periods.  
In parallel, we gauge whether investors display lower disposition effect when 
there is someone to blame as in the case of delegated investments. Because the disposition 
effect is considerably larger for a subsample of funds that are more likely to being 
acquired after advice from the financial intermediary, we reject that hypothesis. Finally, 
we test whether bad emotions or redemption fees could be driving the results and find 
that the economic and statistical significance of the disposition effect still persists.  
In sum, we present sound evidence that individual investors exhibit disposition 
effect in mutual fund trading. Our findings challenge the conclusions of Calvet, 
Campbell, and Sodini (2009a) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2009), who did not find 
evidence that mutual investors suffer from this bias. Moreover, our results reveal that the 
tendency to hold losers is partially offset with literacy. In effect, holding a university 
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degree reduces the propensity to hold losers by 44 percentage points. In addition, trading 
intensity in funds reverts almost entirely the disposition effect. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the variables and 
presents the methodology, whereas section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 discusses 
the results and section 5 draws final remarks. 
 
2. Methodology  
Our database consists of account-level proprietary data from a major Portuguese 
financial institution. The analysis is mostly concentrated on the tables containing 
transactions of securities and funds performed by the bank’s clients. Those tables 
comprise data on the ISIN code of the security (fund) traded, the type of operation 
(buy/sell), the price and quantity traded, among other variables. We merge these tables 
with a dataset containing daily mutual fund prices from Bloomberg and Reuters.  
To reduce the computational burden of estimations, our final dataset containing 
daily prices and transactions is converted into weekly frequency. The disposition effect 
is measured using the procedure put forward by Feng and Seasholes (2005), i.e., we run 
a survival analysis model where a “failure” occurs when the investor performs a 
redemption.2 An investor is included in the final dataset when he/she opens a position in 
a mutual fund. In the wake of that event, the investor becomes at risk. For each week t 
after the first fund shares’ subscription, the conditional probability (i.e., conditional on 
the position on the fund surviving in the portfolio up until week t-1) of redemption is 
estimated. Subsequent subscriptions (those after the initial buy) are considered holds 
given that the investor does, in fact, continues to hold the fund.  
For each investor-fund-position-date in our sample, two types of comparisons are 
carried out. The first comparison involves actual redemption of fund’s shares. When the 
investor redeems a share from a fund, we compare the redemption price with the original 
purchase price (the “reference price”). The share-weighted average purchase price is 
utilized as the reference price in this paper, specifically when multiple subscriptions take 
place before redemption. 
                                                          
2 In robustness exercises, we follow Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and regress a holding indicator at the 
fund position level (1 = Redemption; 0 = Hold) on independent variables using Probit models. We 
reproduce all the major regressions using this methodology but, to conserve space, the results are not 
tabulated. Our conclusions do not change under this alternative econometric setting. 
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When there is no actual redemption, paper gains/losses are estimated. Paper gains 
occur when the share price weekly low is above its reference (purchase). The underlying 
rationale is that the investor could had redeemed his/her positions at any time during week 
t with a profit. Paper losses occur when the share price weekly low is below its reference 
(purchase price), whereby the investor could only had sold for a loss during that week. 
Along the lines of Feng and Seasholes (2005), two different indicators are created. 
The trading profit indicator (TPI) takes a value of one if fund’s shares are redeemed with 
a gain (or the shares are trading at a paper gain), and zero otherwise. The trading loss 
indicator (TLI) takes a value of one if fund’s shares are redeemed for a loss (or the shares 
are trading at a paper loss). TPI and TLI vary over time. Since shares are either trading at 
a loss or at a gain (except in rare instances), we do not include TPI and TLI together in 
our regression models.3 
In our baseline setting, a sell/hold variable (SELL) is regressed against the baseline 
hazard function and other “covariates” assuming the Cox proportional hazard model 
specification. Under this setting, the hazard rate assumes the following functional form: 
  
𝜆(𝑡|𝑥) = 𝜆0(𝑡) × exp
𝛽′𝑥𝑡     [1] 
 
where 𝑥 is a vector of investor-specific independent variables, which may be 
‘fixed’ or time-variant, and 𝛽 is the vector of coefficients. The covariate vector can 
contain investor-demographic characteristics, literacy variables, experience and 
sophistication of the investor, or general market characteristics. Some variables can be 
interacted. The model estimates the proportional hazard rate, 𝜆0(𝑡|𝑥), by multiplying the 
baseline hazard rate, 𝜆0(𝑡), with the relative hazard rate, exp
𝛽′𝑥𝑡. Correspondingly, only 
the relative hazard rate is affected by the covariates. No assumptions are made about the 
baseline hazard rate aside from it being the same for all investors. The estimation is 
obtained using the maximum likelihood estimator. 
A failure event takes place when a fund redemption occurs. Under the current 
setup an investor may have multiple failures. Intuitively, the time between the origin (the 
point where the investor becomes at risk) and each subsequent failure is estimated. In our 
                                                          
3 The adoption of TLI rather than TPI as explanatory variable leads to identical conclusions, whereby the 
corresponding results are not tabulated. 
8 
 
most simple model specification, we regress the sell/hold variable on the baseline hazard 
function and 𝑇𝑃𝐼.  
The next section proceeds with the definition of the variables and a description of 
the sample. 
 
3. Data 
The database contains three different tables covering the 20-year span from 
January 1998 to February 2017. The first table includes socio-demographic individual 
investor data, namely gender, occupation/job, education, country of residence, birth date, 
postal code, and binary variables (Yes/No) indicating whether the investor has savings 
account, consumer credit and mortgage. The second table displays all transaction-level 
records on securities operations (acquisitions and sales). This table contains the following 
variables: date of the transaction, type of transaction (buy or sell), quantity, price, 
currency, ISIN code of the security and security description. The third table encompasses 
mutual funds operations (over the counter subscriptions and redemptions). The table 
comprises information about the date of the transaction, type of transaction (subscription 
or redemption), number of shares, price, currency, ISIN code and fund name.  
Several filters are applied. Records from non-residents are deleted and we drop 
clients that began their stock market activity and with experience in funds before January 
1998. Our objective is to see whether experience influences behavioral biases, whereby 
we exclude all clients with previous experience in the stock market before beginning the 
assessment. We also exclude all closed-end funds and open-end money funds, real state 
funds and funds whose participants benefit from fiscal advantages4, as well as funds that 
distribute dividends. 
Next, we extract from Bloomberg and Reuters time series of the daily prices of 
the mutual funds in the database and match the panel of daily prices with the table of fund 
transactions. We keep all observations from the subscription date to the redemption date 
of a fund. Our final dataset contains 6,926,515 account/fund/date observations from 
31,513 clients.  
Several variables are added to the database. First, we add demographic variables 
such as the gender (female/male), investor age at the time of the first mutual fund 
                                                          
4 In the earlier 2000’s investors in PPR and PPA’s were granted fiscal deductions based on the amount 
invested in the funds. 
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subscription, and education (three dummy variables: educ0 takes the value of one for 
individuals displaying up to 12 years of education and zero otherwise; educ1 takes the 
value of one for individuals displaying 12 or more years of education but have not 
completed a university degree and zero otherwise; educ2 takes the value of one for 
individuals with a university degree and zero otherwise). 
Literacy variables are built on the data from job/employment and education. Our 
more general variable of literacy is educ2. Financial literacy (finlit) and mathematical 
skills (mathskills) are binary variables, equal to one for individuals with higher education 
whose occupation hints at a high level of financial literacy (professionals from the 
banking sector, brokerage services, auditors, economists, certified accountants, financial 
directors), and for those with higher education whose occupation hints at a high level of 
mathematical skills (engineers, physicists, computer and data scientists, economists, 
financial managers), respectively. 
Regarding the variables aimed at capturing the experience and financial 
sophistication of the investors, and given that we expect investors to learn with past 
experience, several dynamic variables reflecting the learning curve are created. 
Equitytrader and bondtrader are binary variables for which the value of one is assigned 
once the investor performs the first trade in stocks and bonds, respectively. These two 
variables translate the simplest interaction of the investor with the securities markets. 
Derivativetrader, foreigntrader and daytrader are binary variables set to one after the 
investor carries out the first trade in derivatives, foreign securities or day trade, 
respectively.  These variables hint at a higher level of investor sophistication than simply 
trading a stock or a bond, since they entail more investor knowledge.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
We include continuous variables in our regression models with the aim of 
capturing the impact of trading intensity and diversity on the disposition effect. The 
number of buy trades performed by the investor in securities markets (numtrades) and the 
corresponding trading value (turnover) capture general trading intensity. The number of 
day trades (daytrading) measures the effect of sophisticated traders’ trading intensity on 
the disposition effect. The number of different securities (diffsec) and funds (difffunds) 
held in the past by the investor measure trading diversity, crude measures of 
10 
 
diversification.5 Finally, the number of fund (buy) operations (numtradefunds) is also 
used as a proxy for knowledge and experience about mutual funds.6  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the mutual fund participants included in 
the assessment. Around 37.5% of the investors live in one of the two major Portuguese 
cities (Lisbon and Oporto), and 61.5% of are male. Only a small percentage of investors 
have a consumer credit (3.3%) or a mortgage (7.0%), but 27.7% have a savings account. 
The level of scholarship of the individuals in our sample is low: most of the individuals 
with non-missing data have less than 12 years of education, and 13.8% of the individuals 
concluded a university degree. About 8.0% of the individuals are managers, and 7.6% 
have a qualified occupation (non-managers). The percentage of individuals with no 
occupation (unemployed, retired and others) hovers around 13.2%. 
Only 4.0% had stock trading experience when they became at risk (8.0% when 
investors exit the sample). The percentage of investors that traded bonds before becoming 
at risk is around 1% (2% when investors exit the sample). The average cumulative number 
of (buy) operations in securities is 0.42 (1.03) per investor when investors become at risk 
(exit). The average cumulative turnover generated in securities markets per investor is 
2,217 Euro when the investors become at risk (5,195 when leaving the sample). Most 
investors have no trades in securities markets, and the number of day traders is also small.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
On average, the number of different securities traded per investor is roughly 0.2 
at inception, and 0.3 at exit. Nevertheless, there is an investor that had traded 63 different 
securities before becoming at risk, and 104 when exiting the sample. With respect to 
mutual fund trading activity, the average number of funds’ (buy) operations (funds’ 
turnover) per investor is 2.8 (15,686 Euro) before entering the sample, and 6.1 (25,219 
Euro) at exit. 
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1. Disposition effect and literacy 
                                                          
5 A greater number of securities or funds in a portfolio is expected to be linked to more experience. 
6 In the construction of variables related to mutual funds trading activity we consider all mutual funds 
included in the investor’s portfolio, including closed-end funds and open-end money funds, real estate funds 
and funds whose participants benefit from fiscal advantages. 
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A natural starting point for our investigation is to regress 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿 against 𝑇𝑃𝐼 in a 
Cox proportional hazard model. Statistical inference is conducted using clustered robust 
standard errors at the investor-fund level (results are in the first row of Table 3).7 The 
estimated hazard rate equals 1.72 and is statistically significant, meaning that the 
probability of a redemption is almost 72 percentage points higher when the investor is 
able to make a positive or null gross profit. 
Beyond the average disposition effect, it is important to test whether this bias 
varies with the literacy of the investor. To that end, we first split our sample by bins of 
individuals and run the baseline specification for each separate group. We find a sizable 
(and statistically significant) difference between investors with and without a university 
degree. The estimated hazard rate for TPI equals 1.47 (1.91) in the subset of individuals 
with (without) higher education. The 44 percentage points difference is economically and 
statistically meaningful.8 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The hazard rate for TPI is 1.45 for financially literate individuals and 1.88 for 
other individuals, a statistically significative difference at a 10% level. As to math skills, 
those with better abilities exhibit a smaller hazard rate for TPI than the others. The 
difference (44 percentage points) is statistically meaningful at a 1% level. We can 
therefore conclude that literacy is a pervasive moderator of the disposition effect 
displayed by mutual fund participants. 
 
4.2. Disposition effect and trading experience 
 
The effect of experience and learning is analyzed attending to the intensity of the 
trading activity, the sophistication of financial instruments held, and the diversity of the 
financial instruments traded. 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 are two binary variables 
for which the value of one is assigned once an investor trades its first stock or bond, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. These variables are time-varying for they may change 
over the investment horizon of the investor.  
                                                          
7 We report hazard rates rather than coefficients. 
8 The estimated hazard rate for TPI is 1.67 for the group of individuals with no information on education. 
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We first add 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 to the baseline model along with its interaction with 
𝑇𝑃𝐼 (Table 4). Given that the coefficient for 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 is not statistically significant, 
it may be inferred that, on average, equity traders and other investors have a similar 
investment horizon. More importantly, 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 × 𝑇𝑃𝐼 is not statistically 
significant, meaning that equity traders and other investors exhibit, on average, a similar 
disposition effect. We obtain virtually identical results for 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 and thus we 
conclude that the disposition effect is not affected by prior experience in stock or bond 
trading. 
We replicate the previous exercise with three variables akin to securities trading 
initiation. The first is 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, a binary variable that is set to one in the wake 
of the first derivative trade, and zero otherwise. We add 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ×
𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 to the baseline specification, and re-run the estimation. In contrast 
with the former cases, 𝑇𝑃𝐼 × 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 loads negatively and its coefficient is 
statistically significant and economically sizable. This means that investors’ experience 
in derivatives trading lowers loss aversion. Our interpretation of the results is that 
derivative trading requires a higher level of sophistication and knowledge than stock or 
bond trading; for that reason, we observe a partial reversion of the disposition effect. 
The second and third variables – 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 - are equal to 
one once an investor starts trading a foreign security or engages in the first day trade, 
respectively. Neither of these covariates appear to affect the disposition effect: their 
interactions with 𝑇𝑃𝐼 are not statistically significant. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The former variables capture different degrees of investor sophistication but fail 
to capture important features of the trading background, such as the intensity and the 
diversity of the trading activity. To get a sense as to whether trading intensity is materially 
relevant, we use the number of (buy) trades in securities markets.9 To reduce the influence 
of outliers and skewness, a log transformation is applied: 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 denotes the log 
of one plus the cumulative number of securities’ buy trades performed up to t. We regress 
                                                          
9 Trades in stocks, bonds and derivatives are considered. 
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𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿 against 𝑇𝑃𝐼 and 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠.10 The interaction term loads negatively with 
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿, and it is economically and statistically significant.  
Alternatively, we use value turnover as a measure of trading activity and compute 
the cumulative value turnover generated by investors’ acquisitions in securities markets 
up to t; 𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 corresponds to the log of one plus the cumulative value turnover 
generated by investors’ buys. Our estimates reveal that 𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝐼 is statistically 
significant and loads negatively with the dependent variable. One important implication 
of these results is that trading experience reverses the disposition effect. 
As regards trading diversity, interactions of 𝑇𝑃𝐼 and the (log of the) number of 
different securities/funds traded by the investor are added to the baseline specification. 
The interaction of 𝑇𝑃𝐼 and the (log of one plus the) number of different securities traded 
up to t (𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡) is negative and statistically significant, and we observe a similar 
relationship when the interaction of 𝑇𝑃𝐼 and the (log of the) number of different traded 
funds up to t (𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡) is added to the baseline specification. In conjunction, these 
results tell us that trading diversity also reverses the disposition effect.  
Two additional measures of investors’ experience are considered: day trading 
intensity and the number of funds’ trades. We add to the baseline specification the (log 
of one plus the) number of day trades performed by the investor up to t (𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
along with its interaction with 𝑇𝑃𝐼, and we do not find an association between these 
variables since 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 is statistically meaningless. Finally, the (log of the) 
number of funds’ trades (𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠) is added, along with its interaction with 
𝑇𝑃𝐼, and find that the coefficient for 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 is negative and 
statistically significant. In other words, the higher the trading experience in terms of 
funds, the lower the reluctance to sell at loss.  
To enrich our analysis, we re-estimate the earlier models while controlling for 
socio-demographic variables. The hazard ratio for TPI rises from 1.72 to 1.75. This small 
change could be either justified by the introduction of control covariates or by 
composition effects of the sample. In effect, the introduction of these additional variables 
lessens the number of observations available for the estimation, since the dataset contains 
missing values for some of the variables (namely occupation and education).  
 
                                                          
10 In some of the regressions that involve continuous covariates, we exclude the covariate from the 
regression and concentrate on its interaction with TPI. The main reason is that the variable and its 
interaction with TPI present significant collinearity, thereby biasing the standard errors. 
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INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Columns [2] to [11] of Table 5 present alternative versions of the model, where 
𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿 is regressed against 𝑇𝑃𝐼, the set of socio-demographic variables, a variable 
denoting experience and its interaction with TPI. Our main interest continues to be the 
coefficient (hazard rate) of 𝑇𝑃𝐼 and its interaction with variables representing experience. 
Hence, only the results for those variables are tabulated in the interest of conserving 
space. In essence, the introduction of control covariates only produces slight changes in 
the estimated coefficients, with the main conclusions of the analysis being preserved. 
In auxiliary tests, we transform our continuous covariates into piecewise linear 
components. This approach offers two advantages: (i) hazard rates are easier to interpret; 
and (ii) it allows to further verify non-linear effects between dependent variables and 
regressors. The major disadvantage concerns the potential arbitrariness in the 
construction of these variables. Table 6 shows results for the estimation of piecewise 
linear specifications.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
As regards trading diversity, 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐 is converted into four different binary 
variables. 𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐 <= 3)𝑡, 𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐]3; 6])𝑡, 𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐 ]6; 10])𝑡 and 𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐 >
10)𝑡 are set to one when the investor displays no previous experience or invested in up 
to three different securities up to period t, traded between four and six different securities 
up to period t, traded between seven and ten different securities, or traded more than ten 
different securities up to period t, respectively. We regress SELL on these binary variables 
and their interactions with TPI. All interactions exhibit positive loads, with hazard ratios 
above one, although the sensitivity of the dependent variable to TPI drops with the 
number of different securities traded by investors (only 𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐 <= 3) ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝐼 and 
𝐼(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐]3; 6]) ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝐼 are statistically significant). The probability of a sale more than 
doubles when the investor has low or no prior experience, vis-à-vis other investors.  
A similar procedure is used with the number of trades: SELL is regressed on four 
piecewise binary variables and their interactions with TPI. Our results closely match those 
obtained for trading diversity and we observe greater disposition effect among investors 
with lower prior experience in securities markets. The hazard ratio for 𝐼(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 >
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20) ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝐼 is above one, but not statistically meaningful, suggesting that the disposition 
effect almost disappears when investors’ trading intensity is high. Results are similar 
when piecewise linear components of turnover are considered instead as proxies for 
trading intensity (Table 6). 
The effects of fund trading intensity and fund diversity are also re-examined using 
the piecewise linear framework. The coefficients for I(numtradefunds <=5)*TPI, 
I((numtradefunds ]5;10])*TPI and I(numtradefunds ]10;30] )*TPI are positive and 
statistically significant. While the overall effect of the number of trades on the disposition 
effect is negative, the relationship is far from being linear. Indeed, the estimated hazard 
rate for I(numtradefunds ]5;10])*TPI is greater than for I(numtradefunds <=5)*TPI, 
which contradicts the idea that the disposition effect correlates negatively with funds’ 
trades. From that point forward, the hazard rate diminishes with the number of traded 
funds, and the disposition effect for individuals with between 11 and 30 trades is 
substantially weaker than for those with less than ten trades. Most significantly, 
individuals that performed more than 30 trades present no disposition effect. On the other 
hand, the disposition effect becomes weaker with fund diversity. Investors that acquired 
less than four different funds in the past exhibit a sharper disposition effect (hazard rate 
above 1.80). The hazard rate for investors that held more than six different funds drops 
to 1.27.  
In aggregate, qualitative similar conclusions are attained when continuous 
variables and piecewise linear binary variables are employed in the assessment.  
 
4.3. Disposition effect, trading experience and literacy 
 
In this section we evaluate whether education, financial literacy and math skills 
affect the negative relationship between the disposition effect and the trading experience. 
Regression models are estimated separately using data on individuals holding a university 
degree and other individuals. We consider eleven alternative models, i.e., one model for 
each proxy for experience. The results are reported in Table 7, columns [1] and [2]. To 
conserve space, only hazard rates (and corresponding t-statistics) for the interaction of 
TPI and the experience variable are tabulated. Each line contains hazard rates for an 
alternative regression model. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
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The hazard rates associated to 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗
𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 are not statistically different from one in 
both subsets of individuals with and without university degree, meaning that past 
experience in trading stocks, bonds, derivatives and foreign securities do not impact the 
disposition effect of the two groups of individuals. However, experience with day trading 
reduces the disposition effect of less educated investors by 42 percentage points.  
With respect to the number of trades and corresponding traded value, the 
coefficients for 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 and 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 are negative, statistically 
significant and almost identical in the two subsamples. A similar pattern is found for 
𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐. Remarkably, 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 and 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 
have negative and statistically significant coefficients in the two subsets, but hazard rates 
are substantially lower for individuals with higher education. In other words, fund trading 
diversity and intensity produce higher impact on the disposition effect when individuals 
have a university degree.  
In Table 7, columns [3] and [4], we tabulate results for a sample split based on 
knowledge about financial markets and products. The hazard rate for 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 is above one and statistically significant for the group of individuals 
lacking financial literacy, and is also above one (although not statistically significant) for 
individuals with financial literacy, suggesting that stock trade onset exacerbates the 
disposition effect of less knowledgeable individuals. The hazard rates for 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗
𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 are not statistically 
different from one in both subsamples. However, day trade onset produces opposite 
effects on the two groups of individuals: those lacking financial literacy exhibit a weaker 
disposition effect in the wake of the first day trade and the disposition effect ramps up 
after the first day trade for the group of more knowledgeable individuals. 
Interestingly, 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 and  𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 have negative 
and statistically significant coefficients in the two subsets but the overall impact of fund 
trading activity over the disposition effect is stronger for individuals with financial 
literacy. The coefficients for 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 and 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 are not 
statistically significant, but 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐 is negative and statistically significant for 
less knowledgeable individuals.  
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Some of the results for the math skills’ sample split closely mimic those obtained 
for financial literacy. For instance, the estimated hazard rate for 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 is 
above one and statistically meaningful for the subset of individuals lacking math skills. 
As to individuals with higher math skills, the estimated hazard rate is below one, although 
not statistically significant. In the cases of 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗
𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
On the other hand, the coefficient for 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 is negative (hazard 
rate below one) and statistically significant only for individuals with higher math skills, 
suggesting that trading experience with foreign securities lessens the disposition effect of 
investors with math skills, but not of other investors. The onset of day trading activity 
contributes (is not effective) to attenuate the disposition effect of individuals lacking 
(with) math skills, whilst the intensity of trading activity in securities markets (measured 
by 𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠 and 𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟) moderates the disposition effect of individuals with 
math skills, but not the disposition effect of other individuals.  
The coefficient for 𝑇𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑐 is negative and statistically significant for 
the two subsamples of individuals, but it is smaller for those that exhibit math skills. Put 
it in another way, securities markets experience, consubstantiated in trading intensity and 
diversity, seems to moderate the disposition effect, that effect being stronger for 
individuals with math skills. Also, the number of traded funds and fund diversity attenuate 
the disposition effect of all individuals. Puzzlingly, we find that while fund trading 
intensity produces stronger effects for individuals with math skills, the impact of fund 
diversity is stronger for individuals lacking those skills. 
All in all, literacy plays a relevant role in shaping the way experience affects the 
disposition effect. Day trading activity weakens the disposition effect of less literate 
mutual fund investors (i.e., those with no university degree, those lacking financial 
literacy or math skills), but does not impact the disposition effect of the highly educated 
individuals. Concerning trading intensity in securities markets, the results are harder to 
interpret. Indeed, trading intensity produces virtually identical impact on the disposition 
effect of individuals with and without a university degree. However, when math skills are 
analyzed, trading intensity appears to produce lower effects for those that lack math skills. 
Finally, experience with mutual funds produces stronger effects for individuals with 
university education and financial literacy.  
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4.4. Additional robustness tests 
The results presented thus far allow us to conclude that mutual fund investors 
exhibit disposition effect and that literacy and experience reverse, at least partially, this 
behavioral bias. In this section, we challenge these conclusions and consider alternative 
explanations for our empirical findings.  
Our results could be explained by the existence of investors’ irrational beliefs in 
mean reversion patterns of fund returns. We compute the 30- and the 180-day past returns 
up to t: DRET30 (DRET180) takes the value of one if the fund generated positive returns 
in the past 30 (180) days and zero otherwise. These binary variables are introduced in 
separate empirical models, i.e., we add DRET30 (DRET180) and its interaction with TPI 
to the baseline regression. If the reluctance to sell losers is entirely explained by mean 
reversion beliefs, then the TPI and DRET30*TPI coefficients should lack predictive 
power, whereas the coefficient for DRET30 should be positive and significant. 
Accordingly, investors would sell funds with positive short-term returns irrespective of 
they being trading at a loss or at a gain.  
The coefficient for TPI is positive and significant (0.258; hazard rate of 1.29), and 
the DRET30 coefficient is negative.11 Thus, if anything, the probability of a redemption 
declines with past performance. The coefficient of TPI*DRET30 is positive and 
statistically significant, meaning that, on average, the probability of a redemption 
increases if the fund is trading at a gain (relative to the acquisition price) and has a positive 
short-term performance. Results for DRET180 are very similar. Thus, the reluctance to 
sell losers cannot be solely explained by beliefs on return reversal. Even after controlling 
for this possibility, the reluctance to sell losers is preserved.  
We also regress SELL on TPI, DRET30 (or DRET180) and TPI times DRET30 (or 
DRET180) separately for the sample of investors with university degree and for those 
without higher education. By and large, the point estimate for TPI remains substantially 
larger among those lacking a university degree, aligned with the idea that education 
attenuates the disposition effect. A similar procedure is used for experience, and the 
results of these auxiliary regressions confirm the role of trading experience (i.e., funds’ 
trading intensity and diversity) as a moderator of the disposition effect. 
An additional robustness test evaluates the impact of market sentiment on the 
disposition effect. We follow the methodology of Pagan and Sossounov (2003): the 
                                                          
11 Non-tabulated results are available from the authors upon request. 
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sample is split into bull and bear market periods and the baseline model is estimated 
separately for each period. The point estimate for TPI in the bull/bear period is 0.83/0.28 
(hazard rate of about 2.30/1.32), economically and statistically meaningful coefficients. 
Thus, mutual fund investors exhibit disposition effect in both periods, although they are 
more prone to sell past winners during bull periods. 
To gauge whether sentiment also conditions the influence of literacy on the 
disposition effect, we conduct a numerical breakdown of our results by education level 
and conclude that the disposition effect rises during bull periods for individuals with and 
without a university degree. Nevertheless, that increase is remarkably stronger for 
investors lacking higher education. As for the impact of trading experience, our estimates 
confirm the role of experience as a moderator of the disposition effect during bull, but not 
bear, periods. In specific, investors with experience in stock trading and derivatives 
(especially those that day trade or invest in foreign securities) exhibit lower disposition 
effect during bull periods. Trading intensity and diversity of both securities and funds 
also alleviate the disposition effect during bull periods, and we do not find statistically 
significant results for these proxies when analyzing bear markets. To put it in another 
way, trading experience is particularly relevant as a moderator of the disposition effect 
during bull markets, but this effect ceases to exist during bear periods. 
Next, we delve into the idea that investors look for someone to blame in the case 
of delegated investments (Chang, Solomon, and Westerfield 2016). To further examine 
this hypothesis, our sample of mutual funds is divided into those managed by subsidiaries 
of the financial institution where investors have their bank account, foreign mutual funds 
and other domestic mutual funds. We posit that the disposition effect should be stronger 
for other domestic mutual funds or foreign funds. The rationale behind this conjecture is 
that bank account managers are more likely to advice individuals to acquire mutual funds 
from their own financial institutions (or its affiliates) than other mutual funds. 
Correspondingly, if the effect of “look someone to blame” is relevant, it should be more 
expressive among those that actually followed the managers’ advice, this meaning that 
the disposition effect should be weaker among these investors.  
Our baseline model is estimated separately for each of the subsamples. The hazard 
rate for TPI is substantially larger when considering funds managed by the financial 
institution (1.92), than for those managed by other Portuguese financial institutions (1.26) 
or foreign institutions (1.23). These estimates do not conform to the notion that when fund 
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participants have the opportunity to blame someone, they exhibit reverse disposition 
effect. 
Another possible explanation for our findings is the existence of good and bad 
emotions. To alleviate concerns that our findings are driven by good/bad emotions, we 
introduce an additional variable in the baseline model: emotions is a binary variable 
indicating whether the last fund redeemed by the participant recorded a positive return as 
of the redemption date. If investors refrain from selling funds because the last time they 
redeemed at a loss, emotions should have a statistically significant and negative 
coefficient. The point estimate for emotions is positive and statistically significant, 
meaning that emotions influences investors’ decision to redeem, but not in the way 
predicted by the theory. More importantly, however, the estimated hazard rate for TPI 
under this setting is 1.78, i.e., almost identical to the setting where emotions are not 
accounted for. 
Finally, the presence of redemption fees in some funds could be the driving force 
of our results. We estimate the baseline regression for a sample of funds without 
subscription and redemption fees. The magnitude of the estimated hazard rate for TPI 
(1.21) drops substantially, but it is still statistically significant. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we present an empirical analysis addressing the existence of 
disposition effect among mutual fund participants. To that end, a large sample of 
transaction-level records from a major Portuguese financial institution is assessed. Our 
dataset covers an extensive period from 1998 to 2017 and includes all trading records of 
31,513 individuals. The disposition effect is evaluated through the lens of survival 
analysis, and our findings hint at a strong disposition effect among mutual fund investors: 
the probability of a fund redemption ramps up more than 70 percentage points when the 
mutual fund is trading at a gain. Our findings challenge the conclusions of Calvet, 
Campbell, and Sodini (2009a) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2009), who did not find 
evidence that mutual investors suffer from this bias. 
In a second research question, we inquire whether financial literacy and trading 
experience weaken the disposition effect exhibited by mutual fund participants. Our 
results show that the tendency to hold losers is partially offset with literacy. In fact, we 
find that general literacy (i.e., holding a university degree) reduces the propensity to hold 
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loser funds. In addition, higher financial knowledge and stronger math skills also reduce 
the reluctance to sell losers or the propensity to sell winners. On the other hand, trading 
sophisticated financial instruments such as derivatives appears to produce greater effects 
in moderating the disposition effect than trading traditional securities such as stocks or 
bonds. 
We also find evidence consistent with the existence of irrational beliefs among 
mutual fund investors, but the disposition effect survives even after accounting for this 
bias. Likewise, we find that although the disposition effect is statistically and 
economically significant during both bull and bear markets, it is more sizable during 
periods of positive sentiment. In parallel, we gauge whether investors display lower 
disposition effect when there is someone to blame (as in the case of delegated 
investments) and reject this hypothesis. Finally, evidence of the disposition effect persists 
after accounting for bad emotions or redemption fees.  
In sum, we present sound evidence that individual investors in mutual funds 
exhibit disposition effect and that this behavioral bias is partially offset with literacy. 
These findings have relevant normative implications given that the existence of the 
disposition effect imposes substantial costs on investors: there are benefits for investors 
(and the society) from the acquisition of higher levels of literacy. 
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Table 1 – Variable definition 
Panel A – Socio-demographic variables/ static variables 
gender A binary variable set to one (zero) if the investor is a male (female). 
age The age of the investor at the transaction date. 
educ0 A binary variable set to one if the investor does not have secondary 
education, and zero otherwise. 
educ1 A binary variable set to one if the investor does have secondary 
education, but does not hold a university degree, and zero otherwise. 
Educ2 A binary variable set to one if the investor does have a university 
degree, and zero otherwise. 
ocup0 A binary variable set to one if the investor is an undifferentiated 
worker, and zero otherwise. 
ocup1 A binary variable set to one if the investor is an unqualified specialized 
worker and zero otherwise. 
ocup2 A binary variable set to one if the investor is a qualified worker 
(without management responsibilities) and zero otherwise. 
ocup3 A binary variable set to one if the investor is a director and zero 
otherwise. 
savings account A binary variable set to one if the investor has a savings account and 
zero otherwise. 
mortgage A binary variable set to one if the investor has a mortgage and zero 
otherwise. 
consumer credit A binary variable set to one if the investor has a consumer credit and 
zero otherwise. 
finlit A binary variable set to one if the investor has an occupation related to 
the financial system or a job in the areas of accounting and finance, 
and zero otherwise. 
mathskills A binary variable set to one if the investor has an occupation that 
requires advanced math skills, and zero otherwise. 
lispor A binary variable set to one if the investor lives in Lisbon or Oporto, 
and zero otherwise. 
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Panel B – Experience related-variables/dynamic variables 
 
equitytrader A binary variable that takes the value of one after the first stock trade 
of the investor, and zero otherwise. 
bondtrader A binary variable set to one after the first bond trade of the investor, 
and zero otherwise. 
derivativetrader A binary variable set to one after the first derivative trade of the 
investor, and zero otherwise. 
foreigntrader A binary variable set to one after the first trade of a foreign security, 
and zero otherwise. 
daytrader A binary variable set to one after the first stock day trade of the 
investor, and zero otherwise. 
numtrades cumulative number of buy trades performed in securities markets. This 
variable considers trades in different securities, namely stocks, bonds 
and derivatives. 
turnover cumulative trading volume generated by the buy trades performed in 
securities markets. This variable considers trades in different 
securities, namely stocks, bonds and derivatives. 
daytrading cumulative number of day trades performed in securities markets. A 
day trade event takes place when the investor buys and sells a security 
in the same trading session. 
diffsec number of different securities traded/held by the investor 
difffunds number of different funds traded/held by the investor (includes all 
types of funds including all closed-end funds and open-ended money 
market funds, real estate funds, and funds associated to fiscal benefits) 
numtradefunds cumulative number of funds’ buy trades. 
I(diffsec <=3) binary variable set to one when the investor displays no previous 
experience or invested in up to three different securities up to period t.  
I(diffsec]3;6]) binary variable equal to one if the investor traded between four and six 
different securities up to period t 
I(diffsec ]6;10]) binary variable equal to one if the investor traded between seven and 
ten different securities up to period t 
I(diffsec >10) binary variable that assumes the value of one if the investor traded 
more than 10 different securities up to period t. 
I(numtrades <=5) binary variable set to one when the investor carried out five or 
less (buy) operations in securities markets up to period t. 
I((numtrades ]5;10]) binary variable set to one if the investor performed between six 
and 10 buy operations in securities markets up to period t. 
I(numtrades ]10;20] ) binary variable set to one if the investor performed between 11 
and 20 buy operations in securities markets up to period t. 
I(numtrades >20) binary variable that assumes the value of one if the investor performed 
more than 20 buy operations up to period t, and zero otherwise. 
I(turnover <=10) set to one when investors have no prior experience in securities 
markets or had traded less than 10,000 Euro up to period t, and zero 
otherwise. 
I(turnover ]10;100]) takes the value of one when investors had traded between 10,000 and 
100,000 Euro up to period t, and zero otherwise. 
I(turnover >100]) takes the value of one when investors had traded more than 100,000 
Euro up to period t, and zero otherwise. 
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I(numtradefunds <=5) set to one if the investor traded fund shares five times or less up to 
period t, and zero otherwise 
I((numtradefunds 
]5;10]) 
assumes the value of one if the investor carried out between six to ten 
fund transactions up to period t, and zero otherwise 
I(numtradefunds 
]10;30] ) 
takes the value of one if the investor carried out between eleven and 
30 fund transactions up to period t, and zero otherwise 
I(numtradefunds >30) one if the investor undertook more than 30 fund transactions up to 
period t, and zero otherwise 
I(difffunds <=3) one when the investors had subscribed between one and three 
different funds up to period t 
I(difffunds ]3;6]) one when the investors had subscribed between four and six 
different funds up to period t 
I(difffunds >6) is set to one after investor had subscribed more than six different 
funds up to period t. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics  
The table presents summary statistics of the data used in the assessment. Our sample contains 
31,513 different investors. Panel A portraits the sample regarding the socio-demographic 
characteristics of investors. Panel B describes the sample with respect to investors’ trading 
background before becoming at risk (i.e., before acquiring mutual funds’ shares) and when they 
exit the sample (i.e., when they redeem all mutual funds’ shares or at February 2017, whichever 
arrives first). 
 
Panel A – Socio-demographic variables 
 (% of investors) 
Region   
Lisbon or Oporto               37.5    
Other               62.5    
Education  
Missing               32.0    
Less than 12 years education               40.7    
Secondary Education               13.6    
University               13.8    
Savings account  
Yes               27.7    
No               72.3    
Consumer Credit  
Yes                  3.3    
No               96.7    
Mortgage  
Yes                  7.0    
No               93.0    
Gender  
Female               38.5    
Male               61.5    
Financial Literacy  
Missing               30.4    
Yes                  3.8    
No               65.8    
Math Skills  
Missing               30.5    
Yes                  5.2    
No               64.3    
Occupation  
Missing               30.4    
Non-employed               13.2    
Undifferentiated                  5.1    
Specialized               35.7    
Qualified                  7.6    
Manager                  8.0    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B – Trading background 
    
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percentiles 
    25 50 75 
equitytrader At inception 4.0% 19.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  At exit 8.0% 26.8% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
bondtrader At inception 1.0% 8.4% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 At exit 2.0% 13.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
# daytrades At inception 0.01 0.42 0 51 0 0 0 
  At exit 0.03 1.15 0 140 0 0 0 
# of buy trades At inception 0.42 5.62 0 704 0 0 0 
  At exit 1.03 10.27 0 1072 0 0 0 
Turnover of buy trades (Euro) At inception 2217 43624 0 4000000 0 0 0 
 At exit 5195 79880 0 6413403 0 0 0 
# of different securities At inception 0.2 1.0 0.0 63.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  At exit 0.3 1.6 0.0 104.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
# of buy operations (funds) At inception 2.8 10.3 1.0 212.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
  At exit 6.1 20.0 1.0 1236.0 1.0 2.0 4.0 
Fund subscriptions (in Euro) At inception 15686 64451 0 6519263 1895 4988 12470 
  At exit 25219 92114 0 7219767 2958 7491 20376 
# of different funds At inception 1.4 1.1 1.0 33.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 
  At exit 2.1 3.3 1.0 139.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Disposition effect and investors’ characteristics 
The table below presents hazard ratios associated with mutual fund participants’ decision to 
hold/redeem fund shares. The dependent variable assumes the value of one every week the mutual 
fund participant redeems fund shares and zero when he/she holds the fund shares. The dependent 
variable is regressed against TPI (binary variable set to one when the fund price is equal or above 
the purchase average weighted price, and zero otherwise). The model is estimated for the full 
sample and for different subsamples: (i1) investors with financial literacy; (i2) investors with no 
financial literacy; (ii1) investors with math skills; (ii2) investors with no math skills; (iii1) 
investors with a university degree; and (iii2) investors without a university degree. Our dataset is 
comprised between January 1998 and February 2017. T-statistics are clustered at the investor-
fund level. ***, **, * denote two-side statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
  Coef.  t-stat 
Groups display equal 
coef. (t-stat) 
Full Sample 1.72*** (29.43)  
No Fin. Literacy 1.88*** (25.29)  
Fin. Literacy 1.45*** (3.34) -1.79* 
No Math. Literacy 1.88*** (25.06)  
Math. Literacy 1.44*** (4.25) -2.40*** 
No University Degree 1.91*** (25.04)  
University Degree 1.47*** (9.45) -5.40*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Table 4 – Disposition effect, sophistication and trading experience  
The table below presents hazard ratios associated with mutual fund participants’ decision to 
hold/redeem fund shares. The dependent variable assumes the value of one every week the mutual 
fund participant redeems fund shares and zero when he/she holds the fund shares. TPI is a binary 
variable set to one when the fund price is equal or above the purchase average weighted price, 
and zero otherwise. TPI is interacted with different variables in a multi-regression setup: 
equitytrader, bondtrader, derivativetrader, foreigntrader, daytrader, lnnumtrades, 
lnnumtradefunds, lnturnover, daytrading, lndiffsec and lndifffunds. The estimation is conducted 
via Cox proportion hazard model. Our dataset is comprised between January 1998 and February 
2017. T-statistics are clustered at the investor-fund level. ***, **, * denote two-side statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
TPI 1.72*** 1.72*** 1.72*** 1.72*** 1.73*** 1.73*** 
 (29.43) (27.86) (29.11) (28.77) (29.37) (29.49) 
equitytrader  1.01     
  (0.26)     
TPI*equitytrader  1.07     
  (1.03)     
bondtrader   0.61***    
   (-3.58)    
TPI*bondtrader   1.02    
   (0.10)    
derivativetrader    0.70***   
    (-3.58)   
TPI*derivativetrader   0.80**   
    (-2.02)   
foreigntrader     1.37***  
     (2.75)  
TPI*foreigntrader    0.91  
     (-0.68)  
daytrader      1.87*** 
      (4.00) 
TPI*daytrader      0.87 
            (-0.85) 
N 6926515 6926515 6926515 6926515 6926515 6926515 
Log-lik -509222.3 -509214.6 -509173.0 -509107.8 -509211.7 -509198.2 
id-funds 36406 36406 36406 36406 36406 36406 
Chi2 866.2*** 878.1*** 902.8*** 941.8*** 877.7*** 902.7*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Control Variables No  No  No  No  No  No  
Clustered SE ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund 
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  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
TPI 2.14*** 1.73*** 1.73*** 1.73*** 1.73*** 2.43*** 
 (20.11) (29.24) (29.28) (29.46) (29.43) (20.10) 
lnnumtradefunds 1.19*** 
     
 (8.45) 
     
TPI*lnnumtradefunds 0.88*** 
     
 (-6.42) 
     
lnnumtrades 
      
 
      
TPI*lnnumtrades 
 
0.97* 
    
 
 
(-1.70) 
    
lnturnover 
      
 
      
TPI*lnturnover 
  
0.99*** 
   
 
  
(-2.39) 
   
daytrading 
   
1.35*** 
  
 
   
(3.17) 
  
TPI*daytrading 
   
0.99 
  
 
   
(-0.11) 
  
lndiffsec 
      
 
      
TPI*lndiffsec 
    
0.93*** 
 
 
    
(-3.00) 
 
lndifffunds 
     
1.19*** 
 
     
(6.10) 
TPI*lndifffunds 
     
0.73*** 
 
     
(-9.09) 
N 6926515 6926515 6926515 6926515 6926515 6926515 
Log-lik -509113.2 -509218.4 -509214.3 -509205.2 -509210.3 -509124.6 
id-funds 36406 36406 36406 36406 36406 36406 
Chi2 954.2*** 866.4*** 866.8*** 902.0*** 868.7*** 910.1*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Control Variables No  No  No  No  No  No  
Clustered SE ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund 
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Table 5 – Disposition effect, sophistication and trading experience: controlling for socio-
demographic characteristics 
The table below presents hazard ratios associated with mutual fund participants’ decision to 
hold/redeem fund shares. The dependent variable assumes the value of one every week the mutual 
fund participant redeems fund shares and zero when he/she holds the fund shares. TPI is a binary 
variable set to one when the fund price is equal or above the purchase average weighted price, 
and zero otherwise. TPI is interacted with different variables in a multi-regression setup: 
equitytrader, bondtrader, derivativetrader, foreigntrader, daytrader, lnnumtrades, 
lnnumtradefunds, lnturnover, daytrading, lndiffsec and lndifffunds. Sociodemographic variables 
are used as control variables. The estimation is conducted via Cox proportion hazard model. Our 
dataset is comprised between January 1998 and February 2017. T-statistics are clustered at the 
investor-fund level. ***, **, * denote two-side statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level. 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
TPI 1.75*** 1.74*** 1.75*** 1.76*** 1.76*** 1.76*** 
 (26.50) (24.39) (26.27) (26.12) (26.34) (26.51) 
equitytrader  0.92     
  (-1.55)     
TPI*equitytrader  1.07     
  (1.05)     
bondtrader   0.61***    
   (-3.18)    
TPI*bondtrader   1.00    
   (-0.01)    
derivativetrader    0.74***   
    (-2.66)   
TPI*derivativetrader   0.78*   
    (-1.89)   
foreigntrader     1.24*  
     (1.75)  
TPI*foreigntrader    0.93  
     (-0.49)  
daytrader      1.74*** 
      (3.38) 
TPI*daytrader      0.85 
            (-0.94) 
N 4710630 4710630 4710630 4710630 4710630 4710630 
Log-lik -362046.3 -362044.0 -362006.6 -361968.8 -362042.1 -362030.1 
N. id-funds 25447 25447 25447 25447 25447 25447 
Chi2 1467.6*** 1472.8*** 1505.3*** 1506.6*** 1477.0*** 1491.5*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
Control Variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund 
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  [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
TPI 2.27*** 1.77*** 1.78*** 1.76*** 1.78*** 2.55*** 
 (18.90) (26.40) (26.48) (26.49) (26.63) (18.44) 
lnnumtradefunds 1.20***      
 (8.16)      
TPI*lnnumtradefunds 0.86***      
 (-6.83)      
lnnumtrades       
       
TPI*lnnumtrades  0.95***     
  (-2.76)     
lnturnover       
       
TPI*lnturnover   0.99***    
   (-3.49)    
daytrading    1.26***   
    (1.97)   
TPI*daytrading    0.99   
    (-0.14)   
lndiffsec       
       
TPI*lndiffsec     0.89***  
     (-3.78)  
lndifffunds      1.22*** 
      (5.99) 
TPI*lndifffunds      0.72*** 
      (-8.47) 
N 4710630 4710630 4710630 4710630 4710630 4710630 
Log-lik -361957.0 -362035.1 -362028.1 -362036.1 -362025.6 -361968.0 
N. id-funds 25447 25447 25447 25447 25447 25447 
Chi2 1493.4*** 1474.8*** 1481.0*** 1483.3*** 1483.0*** 1516.9*** 
Pseudo-R2 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
Control Variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund ID-fund 
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Table 6 – Disposition effect and trading experience: a piecewise linear components’ 
approach 
The table below presents hazard ratios associated with mutual fund participants’ decision to 
hold/redeem fund shares. The dependent variable assumes the value of one every week the mutual 
fund participant redeems fund shares and zero when he/she holds the fund shares. The dependent 
variable is regressed against TPI (binary variable set to one when the fund price is equal or above 
the purchase average weighted price, and zero otherwise), variables representing investors’ 
experience and interactions of investors’ experience with TPI. Piecewise linear components of 
continuous variables (numtrades, numtradefunds, turnover, diffsec and difffunds) representing 
trading experience are utilized as covariates in the econometric specification. The estimation is 
conducted via Cox proportion hazard model. Our dataset is comprised between January 1998 and 
February 2017. T-statistics are clustered at the investor-fund level. ***, **, * denote two-side 
statistical significance at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% level. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
I(diffsec <=3)*TPI 1.69***     
 (26.58)     
I(diffsec]3;6])*TPI 1.19***     
 (3.15)     
I(diffsec ]6;10])*TPI 1.10     
 (0.52)     
I(diffsec >10)*TPI 1.19     
  (0.67)     
I(numtrades <=5) )*TPI  1.74***    
  (29.19)    
I((numtrades ]5;10])*TPI  1.80***    
  (4.48)    
I(numtrades ]10;20])*TPI  1.33*    
  (1.87)    
I(numtrades >20)*TPI  1.18    
  (0.91)    
I(turnover <=10)*TPI   1.88***   
   (10.42)   
I(turnover ]10;100])*TPI   1.62***   
   (4.90)   
I(turnover >100])*TPI   1.27   
   (1.50)   
I(difffunds <=3)*TPI    1.84***  
    (29.74)  
I(difffunds ]3;6])*TPI    1.41***  
    (5.65)  
I(difffunds >6)*TPI    1.27***  
    (4.33)  
I(numtradefunds <=5)*TPI     1.80*** 
     (25.95) 
I((numtradefunds ]5;10])*TPI     2.06*** 
     (17.08) 
I(numtradefunds ]10;30])*TPI     1.65*** 
     (9.91) 
I(numtradefunds >30)*TPI     0.95 
     (-0.76) 
 
 
35 
 
 
Table 7 – Subsample analysis: financial literacy, math skills and education  
The table below presents hazard ratios associated with mutual fund participants’ decision to 
hold/redeem fund shares. The dependent variable assumes the value of one every week the mutual 
fund participant redeems fund shares and zero when he/she holds the fund shares. The dependent 
variable is regressed against TPI (binary variable set to one when the fund price is equal or above 
the purchase average weighted price, and zero otherwise), a variable capturing trading experience 
(derivativetrader, lnnumtrades, lnturnover, lndiffsec and lndifffunds) and an interaction of TPI 
with the former. The estimation is conducted via Cox proportion hazard model. Our dataset is 
comprised between January 1998 and February 2017 and is collapsed by (i) financial literacy, 
math skills and education (university degree). To save space, only the hazard ratios and t-statistics 
for the interaction of TPI and the variable capturing trading experience are tabulated. T-statistics 
are clustered at the investor-fund level. ***, **, * denote two-side statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
  Subsample 
 No University University No Math Skills Math Skills No Financial Lit. Financial Lit. 
Interaction of TPI with          
equitytrader 1.11 0.99 1.18* 0.94 1.16* 1.15 
 (1.22) (-0.13) (1.82) (-0.33) (1.68) (0.55) 
bondtrader 1.01 1.08 1.03 0.91 1.02 1.09 
 (0.06) (0.34) (0.11) (-0.22) (0.09) (0.17) 
derivativetrader 0.89 0.79 0.85 0.66 0.84 1.17 
 (-0.70) (-1.35) (-0.90) (-1.33) (-0.99) (0.33) 
foreigntrader 1.25 0.81 1.16 0.47*** 1.14 0.63 
 (0.66) (-1.09) (0.67) (-2.36) (0.62) (-1.15) 
daytrader 0.58* 1.38 0.59*** 1.58 0.60*** 3.14* 
 (-1.90) (1.18) (-2.30) (0.77) (-2.31) (1.70) 
lnnumtradefunds 0.90*** 0.81*** 0.90*** 0.75*** 0.90*** 0.74*** 
 (-3.31) (-5.79) (-3.34) (-3.92) (-3.44) (-2.93) 
lnnumtrades 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.97 0.86* 0.97 1.03 
 (-3.39) (-2.68) (-0.97) (-1.79) (-1.13) (0.52) 
lnturnover 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.99 0.98* 0.99 1.00 
 (-3.75) (-3.45) (-1.36) (-1.66) (-1.52) (-0.09) 
daytrading 0.88 1.14 0.80* 1.17 0.83* 1.71*** 
 (-0.83) (0.98) (-1.82) (0.47) (-1.73) (2.05) 
lndiffsec 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.93* 0.87*** 0.92* 1.00 
 (-3.81) (-3.54) (-1.76) (-1.99) (-1.94) (0.02) 
lndifffunds 0.85*** 0.74*** 0.67*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.68*** 
 (-2.29) (-5.68) (-4.09) (-4.94) (-5.05) (-2.78) 
 
 
 
